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Regulation of Religious Proselytism in the  
United States 
Howard O. Hunter & Polly J. Price ∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The public regulation of “proselytism” has engendered a great 
deal of discussion about the persecution of religious groups in vari-
ous parts of the world. Much publicity and protest occurred when 
Russia undertook to regulate religious groups and to limit the free-
dom of those who wished to engage in proselytism within that coun-
try.1 Likewise, there has been a great deal of discussion about the 
persecution of Christians and other religious groups in China and in 
various Islamic theocracies. Within the United States, as in other 
parts of the world, there is a growing concern about “dangerous 
cults,”2 fueled in part by instances of religiously motivated suicides. 
In France, for instance, the French National Assembly established in 
1995 a Parliamentary Commission on Cults to identify and investi-
gate so-called “sects” and “new religions.”3 The Commission issued 
a final report identifying 172 religious groups as “harmful and dan-
gerous cults,” and it urged the National Assembly to enact legisla-
 
 ∗ Howard O. Hunter, Dean and Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, 
B.A., J.D., Yale University. Polly J. Price, Associate Professor, Emory University School of 
Law, B.A., M.A., Emory University; J.D., Harvard Law School. The authors acknowledge the 
support of the Emory University Law and Religion Program, Project on Proselytism; this arti-
cle is part of the Project’s international examination of the legal regulation of proselytism. 
 1. One recent news article described the accumulation of religious restrictions in vari-
ous parts of the world: 
In September 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Association instituting a strict system of state registration 
and regulation of religious groups. Greece had already banned proselytizing. And in 
December, Austria passed a law designating that minority faiths can gain legal status 
only after a 10- to 20-year probation. 
Julia Lieblich, Faith vs. Faith: Scholars and Missionaries Search for More Ethical Ways to 
Evangelize, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 20, 1998, Life & Arts, at 3. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Keturah A. Dunne, Comment, Addressing Religious Intolerance in Europe: The 
Limited Application of Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 117, 119 (1999). 
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tion to curtail their activities.4 In the United States as well, one state 
recently designated a commission to examine the activities of so-
called “cults” and make appropriate recommendations.5 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution6 pro-
vides a strong legal basis for the protection of religious expression—
along with speech in general—and Americans often set themselves 
up as arbiters of what is an acceptable level of government regulation 
of religious activities. State regulation of religious activities, including 
proselytism, in the United States is nonetheless problematic in many 
respects. The U.S. legal system currently supports numerous limita-
tions on proselytism that have been found to be acceptable within 
the United States. The boundaries of those limitations, the justifica-
tions for them, and the likely areas of future conflict are the principal 
issues on which this article will focus. 
Americans’ views of religious freedom within the United States 
are often bound by the particular religion at issue. According to 
1999 estimates, some 86% of the U.S. population claims a Christian 
religious preference (59% Protestant, 27% Catholic); another 2% are 
Jewish, 5% report “other,” and approximately 7% express no reli-
gious preference.7 Thus, the overwhelming majority of U.S. residents 
express a religious heritage derived from one religious tradition. 
Proselytism is a central feature of evangelical Christianity, but all 
denominations of devout Christians are called to one degree or an-
other to spread the word of God. Other religions, or sub-sects of 
other religions, follow similar patterns. In some instances the call to 
public worship, such as the public dancing, chanting, and solicita-
tions of the Hare Krishnas, could fall under the rubric of proselytism. 
We use the term “proselytism” here to include speech and associated 
conduct involved in spreading the word of God and persuading oth-
ers to convert or to follow the message delivered by the person or 
group of persons engaged in proselytism. The term does not include 
 
 4. Id. at 119–20. 
 5. A Maryland task force was established in 1998 by the state’s legislature to probe the 
extent of “cult” activity at the state’s public universities and colleges. The task force is the sub-
ject of a lawsuit filed in 1999 by several groups and individuals, including the International 
Coalition for Religious Freedom, which is associated with the Reverend Sun Myung Moon’s 
Unification Church. Diego Ribadeneira, Ire at School: Star of David Unites ACLU, Pat Robert-
son, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1999, at B2. 
 6. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 7. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, 
tbl.89 (1999). 
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all aspects of the free exercise of religion. The focus is on preaching, 
soliciting, canvassing, distributing tracts, and other methods of per-
suasion and teaching about one’s religion. Case law that deals with 
various other aspects of “free exercise,” such as snake handling, ani-
mal sacrifice, the use of hallucinogenic mushrooms, or the wearing 
of items of apparel, may have collateral relevance in the development 
of an understanding of the full scope of legal regulation of religion in 
the United States, but those cases are not directly applicable to the 
speech and behavior encompassed within the definition of prosely-
tism as used in this article. 
This article will consider various aspects of the U.S. legal system 
that affect proselytism. Although the United States has had a long-
standing constitutional guarantee of the “free exercise” of religion, 
there are nonetheless significant constraints upon free exercise di-
rectly relating to proselytism. Some legal commentators, including 
Douglas Laycock, have argued that our decentralized system of gov-
ernment leads to insufficient protection of religious liberty, especially 
for religious minorities.8 Most case law on the subject in the United 
States, as well as most attempts to regulate behavior by ordinance or 
statute, have developed in response to groups or individuals that are 
outside the mainstream. As the number of adherents to religions 
other than Judaism or Christianity increases within the United States 
and as the number of activist, evangelical sects of established relig-
ions, grows, we are likely to see more instances of clashes between 
religious activism and the secular legal system. 
II. REGULATION OF PROSELYTISM IN PUBLIC SPACES: OVERVIEW 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES 
Courts in the United States have treated proselytism as a form of 
free speech within the coverage of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Particular expressions of proselytism, 
usually by members of minority religious sects, have been the basis 
for several judicial decisions that have helped to create the current 
American constitutional law on the permissible scope of state regula-
tion of speech in public spaces. 
Those engaged in the spread of the Word have been door-to-
door solicitors, fiery street preachers, demonstrators, and pamphle-
teers. They have ignored or disobeyed or been prosecuted under or-
 
 8. Douglas Laycock, Religious Freedom and International Human Rights in the United 
States Today, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 951, 951 (1998). 
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dinances pertaining to permits, disturbing the peace, “fighting 
words,” or the protection of privacy and security. The courts have 
expressed concern about the level of discretion given to permitting 
or regulating authorities and the potential for abuse of that discre-
tion. Some of the factors used in deciding these cases include the age 
or make-up of the targeted audience, the character of the particular 
space, and the content and style of the message. The protection of 
the public from terrorists and other criminals has justified some limi-
tations on access, and thereby on speech, as has the government’s in-
terest in the protection of national security on military bases and 
other sensitive locations. Ironically, too much government solicitude 
for the freedom to speak—and to proselytize—may raise questions 
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment if a gov-
ernment agency provides a sympathetic forum for religious speech. 
The number of cases on speech in public places is large, and the 
issues have been covered in great detail elsewhere.9 Most of the rele-
vant disputes have arisen under state and local law, and, until 1925, 
the Supreme Court had not applied the First Amendment to the 
states.10 Although it is fair to characterize the legal regulation of 
proselytism in public spaces today as fairly “settled,” at least in terms 
of constitutional doctrine, these standards are quite different from 
regulations considered acceptable a century ago. An examination of 
state and local laws of the nineteenth century discloses a wide range 
of restrictions that would not be countenanced today.11 
 
 9. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 
(1999); JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: 
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000); Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to 
Change Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251. 
 10. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 
(1927). 
 11. Perhaps the decision most pertinent to this discussion was Davis v. Massachusetts, 
167 U.S. 43 (1897), in which the Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts law that banned all 
public speaking on a public commons without having first obtained a permit from the Mayor. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated, “‘For the legislature absolutely or condi-
tionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of 
the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his 
house.’” Id. at 47; see generally Howard Owen Hunter, Problems in Search of Principles: The 
First Amendment in the Supreme Court from 1791–1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59 (1986); David M. 
Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205 
(1983); David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 
(1981). 
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A. Distributing Religious Tracts: The Case of Alma Lovell 
One of the most famous cases was that of Alma Lovell, a Jeho-
vah’s Witness who was convicted of a misdemeanor for having failed 
to get a permit from the city manager of Griffin, Georgia, prior to 
distributing religious tracts.12 The ordinance required that anyone 
who sought to distribute “circulars, handbooks, advertising, or 
literature of any kind” first had to obtain a permit from the city man-
ager. Lovell did not do so for religious reasons. She was called by 
God to spread the word and she needed no permit from a secular au-
thority. Indeed, in her religion’s view, to seek a permit would have 
been an insult to God. The Supreme Court ruled in Lovell’s favor 
because the ordinance was overbroad and granted too much discre-
tion to one charged with a ministerial function.13 In effect, the ordi-
nance allowed the city manager to act as censor and to impose a 
prior restraint on the exercise of the right of free speech or, in this 
instance, the right freely to distribute religious tracts. Although Alma 
Lovell set out to proselytize, the decision in her case likely would 
have been the same if the speech had been purely secular. The key 
problems were the absence of standards in the ordinance for the issu-
ance of permits based upon legitimate state interests, such as traffic 
control and public safety, and the prior restraint inherent in the per-
mit requirement itself.14 
The content of Alma Lovell’s speech—spreading the word of 
God as understood by members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect—was 
not relevant to the decision. She could have been distributing tracts 
on any number of subjects, secular or religious. The ordinance was 
unconstitutional because it granted to a government official so much 
discretion that he could act as a censor.15 The constitutional issue 
was one of equal access without content discrimination. In fact, the 
Supreme Court has noted the importance of door-to-door solicita-
 
 12. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
 13. See id. at 451. 
 14. In general, a prior restraint on speech, regardless of content, is unconstitutional. See, 
e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Carroll v. President and 
Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181–85 (1968); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 
712–23 (1931). 
 15. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (holding unconstitutional an 
ordinance that required licensing of sexually oriented businesses because of the absence of time 
restraints on the exercise of the licensors’ authority and the absence of a procedure for timely 
judicial review); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a Mary-
land motion picture censorship law for lack of procedural safeguards). 
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tion to groups that have little means of access to advertising or to the 
media. Even a facially reasonable ordinance, such as a prohibition of 
door-to-door solicitations in an industrial town to prevent annoy-
ance to night shift workers who sleep during the day, has been held 
to be overly broad and burdensome upon what Justice Black charac-
terized as “poorly financed causes of little people.”16 
Alma Lovell’s case did not decide all issues having to do with 
permits. She was but one person using public spaces—city streets and 
sidewalks—for the distribution of literature. If a group wants to hold 
a parade or a demonstration or a public religious service, there are 
legitimate state interests in maintaining traffic control and protecting 
public safety. Some areas, such as sidewalks, public parks, courthouse 
grounds and capitol grounds, are traditionally considered to be loca-
tions for public speech. They are natural and historical gathering 
places, but, even so, the state or local government wants to maintain 
some order so that all users can have reasonable access. Some permit-
ting is allowable for planning purposes. Other cases have developed 
guidelines on the scope of allowable permitting based upon the loca-
tion, size of the group, nature of the speech activity, and other fac-
tors. The religious content of the speaker’s message may have little 
or nothing to do with the protection of a proselytizer, but there is a 
high degree of protection for speech in most public spaces. 
B. Public Demonstrations, Parades, and Gatherings 
The government does have a legitimate interest in maintaining 
order in public spaces, and, to do so, a government may require a 
permit to protect the movement of traffic and to ensure equality of 
access even if the content of the expression is religious. In Cox v. 
New Hampshire,17 a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses marched on city 
sidewalks in a New Hampshire town without having first obtained a 
parade permit. They carried placards and apparently caused some dis-
ruption in the flow of pedestrian traffic. A unanimous Supreme 
Court upheld their convictions for violating a state law that prohib-
ited parades or processions on public streets without a permit and 
without paying a fee.18 The Witnesses had refused to seek a permit 
for the same reason as Alma Lovell—they were following God’s 
mandate to spread the word and they needed no human permission 
 
 16. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
 17. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
 18. See id. at 575–77. 
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to do so. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that New Hamp-
shire had the power to police the public streets and sidewalks to 
maintain order and safety. Requiring a permit allowed the police to 
make reasonable preparations for traffic control and also avoided the 
problem of competing parades. The statute was drawn narrowly 
enough, and it served a legitimate governmental interest. 
The traffic control justification will not save all ordinances that 
require parade permits. There must be reasonable, clear, and nar-
rowly drawn standards to prevent the possible abuse of discretion by 
a permitting official who may not like the message being delivered by 
the group seeking a permit.19 Likewise, a reasonable purpose, such as 
limiting loud noises in residential areas, might not be enforced by a 
complete ban on instruments such as bullhorns or loudspeakers, but 
by the promulgation of rules that limit decibel volumes or the times 
during which amplification devices can be used in certain areas.20 
To handle the costs of expected crowds or hostile reactions, 
some local governments have tried to charge substantial fees for 
permits. In early 1987, a small group of civil rights demonstrators 
attempted to march in Forsyth County, Georgia, to mark the holiday 
for Martin Luther King, Jr. They were thwarted by a much larger 
crowd of hostile demonstrators who were committed to the mainte-
nance of Forsyth County’s reputation as the “whitest” county in 
America. There was considerable public outcry, and a few weeks later 
there was a large parade of some 20,000 civil rights supporters from 
a shopping center to the county seat. There were about 1,000 
counter-demonstrators, but there were no incidents due in large 
measure to the presence of some 3,000 police and members of the 
National Guard. The county subsequently passed an ordinance that 
required a fee of up to $1,000 per day for demonstrations on public 
property if the permitting authority determined that the demonstra-
tion was likely to present the county with unusual costs. In a 1992 
decision, the Supreme Court found the ordinance to be facially inva-
lid as “standardless” and a “tax” on free expression.21 There may be 
some fee for a permit to use public property, but it cannot be so sub-
 
 19. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 496 (1939). 
 20. Compare Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), with Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 
77 (1949). See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 21. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). The complainant 
organization wanted to hold a demonstration to protest the creation of the King Holiday, and 
they challenged the requirement of a $100 fee. See id. at 136–37; Collin v. Smith, 447 F. 
Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff’d, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).  
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stantial as to amount to a tax or a fine, nor can the permitting au-
thority have the discretion to charge differing fees in a way that 
might constitute content discrimination. 
The reasonableness of state regulations will vary depending on 
the location of the speech activity. Alma Lovell was walking on city 
sidewalks. If she went to the door of a private residence, the resident 
could ask her to leave or could refuse to come to the door, but the 
City of Griffin could not require her to seek permission in the first 
place to move around on city streets and sidewalks. Persons have the 
right to gather on open public property to exercise speech rights but 
may be required to give notice or to abide by regulations that seek to 
avoid conflicting events in the same place at the same time. Public 
parks, sidewalks, and streets are presumptively public fora in which 
the freedom to speak is at a very high level. But what of other spaces, 
such as libraries, schools, courthouses, airports, and state fairgrounds 
where large numbers of people congregate? In general, the Supreme 
Court has distinguished traditional public fora, in which little regula-
tion beyond traffic control is permissible, from other spaces in which 
more regulation is constitutional.22 
The 1981 Supreme Court decision in Heffron v. International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON)23 is instructive. The 
annual Minnesota State Fair is a large event that, at the time of the 
litigation, drew about 100,000 daily attendees. The rules of the fair 
required that anyone who wanted to distribute or sell merchandise of 
any kind, including pamphlets, tracts, or other documents, had to do 
so from a designated booth. The booths were available on a non-
discriminatory, first-come, first-serve basis. ISKCON challenged the 
booth rule as an impediment to religious beliefs and the practice of 
Sankirtan, a ritual that requires members to distribute literature and 
to solicit contributions for the religion in public places. The Supreme 
Court found the rule to be a reasonable exercise of the police power 
to maintain public order and safety at the state fair.24 The state did 
not treat ISKCON any differently from any other group,25 and the 
religious nature of the message did not give it any higher priority 
 
 22. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
 23. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
 24. See id. at 647–55. 
 25. See id. at 649. 
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than the message of any other group.26 The decision provided a 
sound basis for similar rules in other busy locations, such as airports. 
Two decisions in 1966 affirmed the use of public spaces other 
than streets, parks, and sidewalks for the dissemination of ideas orally 
or in writing but subject to reasonable regulation appropriate to the 
principal uses and functions of the particular space. In the first case, 
five young black men in 1964 entered a segregated public library in 
Louisiana and asked for a book. The librarian told them it would be 
ordered and suggested they return later after it had arrived. She then 
asked them to leave because the library was reserved for the use of 
white patrons. They politely refused and quietly sat and read until 
the sheriff came and arrested them for breach of the peace. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court reversed their convictions, partly on due 
process grounds and partly because they were exercising the right of 
peaceable assembly in a public space to petition for the redress of a 
grievance against the government—the racial segregation of public 
libraries.27 The location was directly related to the purpose of the 
symbolic speech, and the young men did nothing to disrupt the 
function of the library.28 There was a similar result in another civil 
rights case that involved praying and singing on the grounds of the 
state capitol in Columbia, South Carolina.29 
For a person interested in proselytism, a library might not be a 
good location for oral messages, but it could be a prime location for 
quiet distribution of written materials. The grounds of a state capitol 
may be more suited for political demonstrations, but it is also a 
community gathering place and a seat of government where there 
may be good opportunities or reasons for engaging in proselytism. 
Somewhat greater state regulation has been condoned in connec-
tion with demonstrations or speech in or near jails and schools. In 
the former instance, there is always the concern for the maintenance 
of order,30 and, in the latter, the school officials want to assure the 
safety of the children and to protect the integrity of the educational 
mission. In Grayned v. Rockford,31 the Supreme Court upheld an or-
 
 26. See id. at 652. 
 27. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
 28. See id. at 142. 
 29. See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
 30. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 31. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
6HUN-FIN.DOC 8/1/01  7:08 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
546 
dinance that barred a demonstration near a school. In the majority 
opinion, Justice Marshall articulated the reasons for various kinds of 
“time, place, and manner” restrictions on otherwise protected speech 
in public spaces: 
‘Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out 
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.’. . . 
The right to use a public place for expressive activity may be re-
stricted only for weighty reasons. Clearly, government has no 
power to restrict such activity because of its message. Our cases 
make equally clear, however, that reasonable ‘time, place and man-
ner’ regulations may be necessary to further significant governmen-
tal interests, and are permitted. For example, two parades cannot 
march on the same street simultaneously, and government may al-
low only one . . . . A demonstration or parade on a large street dur-
ing rush hour might put an intolerable burden on the essential flow 
of traffic, and for that reason could be prohibited. . . . If overampli-
fied loudspeakers assault the citizenry, government may turn them 
down. . . . Subject to such reasonable regulation, however, peaceful 
demonstrations in public places are protected by the First Amend-
ment. . . . The crucial question is whether the manner of expression 
is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular 
place at a particular time.32 
Military bases are subject to even more limitations for reasons of 
security and military order.33 The base commander has a considerable 
amount of discretion in fashioning regulations particular to the base, 
although both soldiers and civilian employees continue to have basic 
First Amendment rights.34 Military bases have not been the sites for 
proselytism cases of the Alma Lovell type, but it is fair to say that the 
courts are likely to continue a pattern of deference to military com-
manders in the management of their particular bases so long as there 
 
 32. Id. at 115–16 (citing, inter alia, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 
(1969); see also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 
293 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941); Hague v. Committee for 
Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
 33. The rules may even extend to the wearing of religious articles of clothing. See 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding a ban on the wearing of nonmili-
tary headgear, i.e., a yarmulke). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828 (1976). 
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is a rational connection between a regulation and the maintenance of 
good order and discipline essential to the proper functioning of the 
military services. 
C. Proselytism Activities in Airports and Shopping Centers 
More recent cases have involved airports. Since the rash of 
hijackings that plagued the airline industry a quarter century ago, all 
commercial airports in the United States have been required to insti-
tute a series of strict security procedures. Travelers are familiar with 
the metal detectors and x-ray machines through which people and 
their belongings must pass. Those in charge of security go to some 
lengths to protect what are known as the “sterile” zones—the areas 
past the security checkpoints—to make sure that no unauthorized 
persons are in those zones. If there is a threat of a terrorist attack, 
the protected zone may be extended so that the time a vehicle may 
stop to load or unload passengers can be limited or the time that in-
dividuals can stand on the sidewalks outside the airport may be lim-
ited. An airport, however, is a public facility and the gathering point 
for large numbers of people. It is a logical place for a speaker who 
wants to preach to crowds or to distribute handbills. All substantial 
commercial airports are publicly owned. The private airlines and the 
many vendors who have space within the buildings lease space from 
the public authority (or the city, county, state, or other government 
that owns the airport). The airlines solicit customers and, by implica-
tion, the friends and families of those customers who escort them to 
and from the airport. The other business enterprises want as much 
traffic as possible. Subject to the legitimate concerns about protec-
tion from hijackers or terrorists as well as ordinary criminals, an air-
port is an open public space to which large numbers of people are 
encouraged to come and which usually is accessible by inexpensive 
public transportation. During the year 2000, for example, the num-
ber of passengers who used the Hartsfield International Airport in 
Atlanta was roughly equivalent to the total population of Germany, 
and that figure does not include visitors who were not passengers. 
There should be no surprise, then, that airports have become fa-
vored locations for proselytizing, nor that there might be some fric-
tion between the person who wants the freedom to preach without 
interference and those who are responsible for security. For order 
and security reasons, the Port Authority of New York and New Jer-
sey, which controls the three major New York airports (Newark, La-
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Guardia, and Kennedy), promulgated an outright ban on the solici-
tation of money by anyone and on the sale and distribution of litera-
ture within airport terminal buildings by groups other than conces-
sionaires who were leasing space. This ban was challenged by 
ISKCON in a case that resulted in a 1992 Supreme Court decision. 
The Court upheld the ban on the solicitation of money but struck 
down the ban on the sale or distribution of literature.35 One-on-one 
solicitations of money raise questions about fraud, overreaching, pos-
sible preying on the vulnerable, and so forth, and, in general, courts 
tend to allow considerable flexibility in regulating such solicitations. 
Striking down the ban on the distribution of literature was not sur-
prising, but the surprise in the Court’s opinion was the decision (by 
a 5-4 margin) that an airport is not a public forum for purposes of 
speech activities. The victory was a pyrrhic one for ISKCON and 
other proselytizing groups. The majority focused on the main pur-
pose of an airport—to facilitate travel and to promote commerce.36 
In the majority’s view, an airport was not a traditional space for ex-
pressive activity, as, for example, a town square or the steps of a state 
capitol would be.37 Expressive activities were secondary notwith-
standing the large numbers of persons passing through an area sup-
ported by the commercial activities of airlines and concessionaires 
and also by public tax monies. 
The airport cases illustrate the hierarchy that occurs in the treat-
ment of speech in public spaces. There are some governmental con-
cerns common to all spaces, e.g., traffic control, reasonable order 
(avoiding two parades on the same street at the same time), and pub-
lic safety. To protect those interests, a government may require some 
advance notice or place some modest restrictions, such as decibel 
maximums on the speaker, but the constitutional tilt is in favor of 
the speaker and not the regulator. There are, in addition, spaces in 
which speech is more likely to be protected than in other places. The 
courts seem to focus on the following questions: (1) Has the space 
traditionally been used for expressive activities? (2) Are there serious 
security concerns? (3) Who are the persons likely to be the target au-
dience within the space? That leads, if one looks at all the cases, to an 
 
 35. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Lee 
v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992). 
 36. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 682–83. 
 37. See id. at 680. 
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ordering of public spaces from high to low in the protection of 
speech. Town squares, public parks, sidewalks, and areas around leg-
islative or executive office buildings or courthouses are high protec-
tion areas. For example, the threat of terrorism and the bombings of 
buildings such as the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City 
have led to security measures that have gone well beyond the imme-
diate perimeter of a public building, resulting in the curtailment of 
the use of some traditional fora. Consider, for example, the closing 
of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House. School 
grounds and the interiors of buildings such as courthouses and capi-
tols are areas of lower protection, or, put another way, the level of 
regulation may be higher. Airports and military bases are in a third 
category. They are defined out of the “public forum” category be-
cause they are not spaces traditionally reserved for expressive activity. 
The level of regulation may be high and may include outright prohi-
bition of speech that may be constitutionally protected in another 
space. 
Those who engage in public proselytism must be aware of these 
distinctions and the limitations that may be imposed on religious ex-
pression in certain public spaces. Nevertheless, the categorization of 
spaces employed by the Supreme Court is unnecessarily rigid—
whether one is considering religious expression or another form of 
speech. There can be little quarrel with the concept of reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions. Public spaces are meant for use 
by all, and reasonable traffic rules assist in the efficient and fair use of 
such spaces by all speakers.38 Fair standards can be applied to all pub-
lic spaces taking into account the varying purposes of such spaces 
and the legitimate questions of security and efficient use. Placing dif-
ferent spaces into different categories that increase or decrease the 
presumptive First Amendment rights of users is unnecessary. An air-
port may not be the same as a town meeting hall in New Hampshire, 
but it is a public space where a large number of people congregate 
and where there are constant examples of expressive activity. The 
walls are covered with advertisements. Many waiting areas are outfit-
 
 38. Even so, there may be a cost to one such as a Jehovah’s Witness who considers it 
wrong to have to ask permission from any secular authority to do God’s work. What may seem 
a minor, non-intrusive, and reasonable regulation to the majority of speakers, religious or not, 
may be a major intrusion to some. In this way Alma Lovell’s case illustrates one of the most 
basic and probably irreconcilable points of conflict between secular authority and an individ-
ual’s personal relationship with God. 
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ted with television sets tuned to CNN—and they cannot be turned 
off. These televisions blare forth the news of the day, stories about 
business, sports, the weather, fashion, travel, even religion. The sto-
ries are interrupted by advertisements for all kinds of products. Most 
larger airports are like shopping malls with stores for every conceiv-
able product, each seeking to gain the attention of passers-by. There 
are usually several public address systems. There are bars, restaurants, 
private lounges, children’s play rooms, special rooms for smokers, 
shower rooms, and, almost always, one or more interfaith chapels. 
Thus, the patrons of an airport can learn the news (press freedom), 
be bombarded by commercial messages (freedom of speech), and 
pray (religious freedom), all within the terminal buildings. There is 
nothing to stop a person from expressing to all within voice range a 
political opinion on a topic of the day. No wonder that some might 
consider an airport to be fertile ground for religious expression in the 
form of proselytism. 
The uses of spaces change over time, and that point has been 
well illustrated by the tension between private property and individ-
ual free expression. A by-product of the industrial revolution was the 
creation of the “company town.” An industrial enterprise would 
build modest houses on company-owned property adjacent to a mill 
and rent the homes to workers. A passer-by would see a “town” of 
similar houses, usually built on a grid, with a general store in the 
middle. A Jehovah’s Witness was stopped from distributing literature 
in a company town because the whole town, streets and all, were pri-
vate property. The Supreme Court disagreed and held in a 1946 de-
cision that the company town had all the earmarks of an ordinary 
town.39 As such, it was presumptively open to public use of the 
streets and sidewalks for free speech, which included the right to dis-
tribute religious literature. 
The company town analogy failed, however, when applied to 
shopping centers a generation later. The argument that shopping 
centers had supplanted traditional town centers as the natural gather-
ing places for the community seemed at first to carry the day. In 
1968 the Supreme Court held that a state trespass law could not be 
used to halt peaceful union picketing of a store in a private shopping 
center,40 but, in two subsequent decisions, four and eight years later, 
 
 39. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 40. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 
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the Court reversed itself and held that the property owner’s right of 
exclusion trumped any individual’s right of free expression on the 
private property of a shopping center.41 The rules may be different 
under a state constitution,42 but, for the time being, the federal in-
terpretation is clear—the company town analogy does not extend to 
modern shopping centers. In a shopping center—whether an en-
closed mall or an open air collection of stores—proselytism is by invi-
tation only. 
D. “Fighting Words,” Hostile Audiences, and Religious Speech 
Sometimes the problem of security is the result of the tension be-
tween a speaker and the audience. A proselytizer who sharply criti-
cizes another religious group or calls into question a set of funda-
mental beliefs may provoke a reaction from the crowd. How are the 
police to handle such conflicts? By stopping the speaker? By trying to 
control the audience? By separating the antagonists? All these meth-
ods have been tried, with varying legal results. 
In a 1940 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction 
of a Jehovah’s Witness who was charged with inciting a breach of the 
peace by reason of the content of his proselytizing speech on the 
streets of New Haven, Connecticut. He was noisy and vocally critical 
of all organized religious groups, but most especially the Roman 
Catholic Church. New Haven has a large number of Catholic resi-
dents, and people on the streets complained to the police that they 
were highly offended. One said he felt like hitting the speaker, al-
though he did not do so. The Court, however, found no basis for 
the conviction and stated that the speech was protected no matter 
how offensive some might find the criticism of the Roman Catholic 
Church or other religious groups.43 
But in a case decided two years later, the Supreme Court sus-
tained the conviction of another Jehovah’s Witness under a New 
Hampshire law that prohibited a speaker from addressing another 
person in an offensive or derisive manner in a public space. The 
speaker also strongly criticized organized religion, but he went on to 
 
(1968). 
 41. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 
U.S. 551 (1972). 
 42. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 43. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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call particular individuals “racketeers” and “fascists.” The Court rea-
soned that such language might provoke a violent response from the 
target and that the state could prohibit or punish such speech in or-
der to maintain the peace.44 The case has come to represent the 
“fighting words” exception to First Amendment protection. 
Although the “fighting words” case never has been overruled, 
the likelihood of a conviction for similar speech today is low. Not 
only has society become more tolerant of the public utterance of im-
polite or offensive speech on all manner of subjects, the subsequent 
cases have tended to protect the speaker rather than the sensibilities 
of the hearer. In a well-known 1971 decision, the Supreme Court 
held that a young man could not be punished for wearing a jacket 
that had been embroidered with a four-letter word expressing an 
opinion about the military draft even though he wore the jacket in-
side a courthouse.45 The next year the Court reversed a Georgia con-
viction of an anti-war demonstrator who called a police officer foul 
names and cursed while the police officer tried to clear a pathway 
among the demonstrators into a draft-induction center.46 The same 
year a majority of the Court vacated three convictions for the use of 
foul and offensive language at a school board meeting at which chil-
dren, as well as adults, were present.47 There has been a considerable 
amount of controversy about the “fighting words” cases,48 but the 
Supreme Court has carved out a broad range of protected speech 
that may include curse words, epithets, scatological terms, sexual 
terms, and highly critical statements or opinions about the religious 
beliefs, philosophy, personal code of conduct, or political beliefs of 
one or more of those in the audience. 
The “hostile audience” cases present a somewhat different pic-
ture. A speaker was convicted of breach of the peace because he 
called members of an audience “slimy scum,” but the Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction. Even though the speech encouraged 
 
 44. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 45. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 46. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519–20 (1972). 
 47. See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 
913 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). 
 48. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, 
Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283; 
Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 
(1990). 
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disputes, the Court reasoned that encouraging disputes is the pur-
pose of free speech.49 But in a case two years later, the Court sus-
tained the conviction of a fiery civil rights speaker who exhorted a 
crowd on a sidewalk to fight for civil rights and who called President 
Truman a “bum” and the American Legion a “Nazi Gestapo.”50 An 
outraged onlooker threatened to throw the speaker off his soapbox 
and shut him up. The police did so instead and justified the action as 
necessary to prevent a minor riot. During the civil rights period in 
the 1960s, the Supreme Court began to take a more tolerant view 
toward fiery speakers and to suggest that the police should prevent 
disorderly conduct by concentrating on crowd control and manage-
ment rather than by squelching speech.51 
One of the more effective means of dealing with hostility be-
tween speaker and audience has been to create areas of separation. 
This has been accomplished in some instances by court order52 and 
in other instances by statute.53 Separating the speaker from the hos-
tile audience, so that words may flow back and forth but physical 
confrontations are not likely, serves the reasonable interests of both 
speaker and audience. 
E. Entanglement with Religious Speech 
Allowing speech, religious or otherwise, may create the impres-
sion that a public agency is supportive of the speech in question. 
That is one reason why military base commanders are wary of parti-
san political speech on base—the military is to serve the civilian gov-
ernment without regard to the identity of the political party of the 
governmental leadership. If the content of the speech being tolerated 
or apparently sponsored by a governmental unit is religious, then 
there may be an Establishment Clause problem. The issue has arisen 
most recently in the context of public schools. Students in public 
 
 49. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
 50. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
 51. See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
 52. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Galella v. Onassis, 533 F. Supp. 1076 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 53. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding statute that prohibited any 
person from knowingly approaching within eight feet of another person near a health care 
facility without that person’s consent). 
6HUN-FIN.DOC 8/1/01  7:08 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
554 
schools are entitled to follow their own religious beliefs, even if those 
may conflict from time to time with secular ceremonies (pledging al-
legiance to the flag)54 or even school attendance laws.55 They also 
may participate in groups that have religious connections if those 
groups are treated equally with nonreligious groups and there is no 
governmental favoritism toward the religious groups.56 
There is a fine distinction between tolerance for religious expres-
sion within a school by making facilities available for student reli-
gious groups the same as for the Science Club or the Math Club and 
institutional entanglement with religion. In 2000, the Supreme 
Court held that public prayer by a student at a school sporting event 
violated the Establishment Clause, notwithstanding that the speaker 
had been chosen in a democratic election by the students.57 That rul-
ing protects the interests of those who are members of minority reli-
gious groups and those outside the mainstream. In a school election, 
the most probable representative to be chosen by popular vote is one 
who is a member of the dominant religion or culture. Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the Court, stated: 
This policy likewise does not survive a facial challenge because 
it impermissibly imposes upon the student body a majoritarian 
election on the issue of prayer. Through its election scheme, 
the District has established a governmental electoral mecha-
nism that turns the school into a forum for religious debate. It 
further empowers the student body majority with the authority 
to subject students of minority views to constitutionally im-
proper messages. The award of that power alone, regardless of 
the students’ ultimate use of it, is not acceptable. . . . Such a 
system encourages divisiveness along religious lines and threat-
 
 54. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (finding 
that a Jehovah’s Witness could not be compelled to pledge allegiance to the flag). 
 55. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 56. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) 
(finding that the Ku Klux Klan could not be barred from erecting a cross on a public forum—a 
state-owned plaza around the Capitol in Columbus, Ohio—because the cross was a form of 
private expression); Lambs Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 
(1993) (finding a school district that allowed after-hours use of school buildings for social, 
civic, and recreational purposes and by political organizations could not exclude an organiza-
tion because it had a religious affiliation, having created a public forum); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a state university that allowed registered student groups to 
use its facilities could not bar one such group from using a space for religious worship and dis-
cussion). 
 57. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,  530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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ens the imposition of coercion upon those students not desir-
ing to participate in a religious exercise. Simply by establishing 
this school-related procedure, which entrusts the inherently 
nongovernmental subject of religion to a majoritarian vote, a 
constitutional violation has occurred.58 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
dissented from the Court’s opinion. The dissenters disagreed with 
the decision that the school policy was unconstitutional on its face 
because the speaker, selected by the students, could have spoken on 
a nonreligious topic.59 
III. TORT LAW AND PROSELYTISM 
The methods of persons engaged in proselytism in the United 
States are subject not only to ordinance and statute (including in 
some instances criminal law) but also to civil damages in lawsuits 
brought by persons who claim to have been harmed by those activi-
ties. Lawsuits between private individuals and groups, apart from di-
rect government regulation, play an important role in the legal envi-
ronment governing proselytism in the United States. Recently, one 
of the most prominent areas of contention relevant to proselytism 
has been the application of traditional tort law principles to relig-
iously motivated activities.60 In recent decades, a stark rise in the 
number of tort lawsuits involving proselytism activities has raised 
fundamental questions in the United States about the limits of reli-
gious freedom. In what circumstances will the methods of religious 
proselytism constitute a tort? What types of harms should be com-
pensated, and who determines when “harm” has occurred? 
Tort law, along with contract and property law, provides a litiga-
tion forum for private individuals and groups in relationship with 
each other. In these lawsuits, the government, through the courts, 
stands theoretically as a passive arbiter of the dispute. Tort law is fre-
quently said to preserve public order by providing a dispute resolu-
 
 58. Id. at 2283. 
 59. See id. at 2285. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 60. For articles summarizing tort suits in the religious proselytism context, see Barry A. 
Fisher, Devotion, Damages and Deprogrammers: Strategies and Counterstrategies in the Cult 
Wars, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 151 (1991); Laura B. Brown, Note, He Who Controls the Mind Con-
trols the Body: False Imprisonment, Religious Cults, and the Destruction of Volitional Capacity, 
25 VAL. U. L. REV. 407 (1991); Note, A New Cause of Action for Members of Religious Groups 
Suing Their Parents for Attempting to Deprogram Them, 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 656 (1984). 
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tion mechanism when private persons believe themselves to have 
been harmed by other individuals or groups.61 These judgments re-
flect social conventions and tend to reflect what the majority believes 
to be acceptable behavior. 
The fundamental approach of American tort law generally has 
been to provide for monetary damages to a person who has been 
harmed because a defendant’s conduct is deemed tortious. One 
scholar has noted: 
The law of torts is a powerful weapon in society’s suppression of in-
tolerable activities; its doctrines are flexible and open-ended and 
the contours of those doctrines often are filled in by juries rather 
than by legal elites. Tort law is thus extraordinarily responsive to 
and reflective of societal mores, and serves a useful function in al-
lowing persons who are harmed by another’s actions to sue to re-
cover damages for their injuries, judged by a common-sense stan-
dard of social tolerance.62 
In the United States, courts recognize certain common law doc-
trines in tort to provide monetary damages to individuals who claim 
to have been harmed by the religious conduct of others. Common 
law tort doctrines vary from state to state but are essentially similar in 
recognizing some privacy interest and bodily, if not also mental, in-
tegrity for both groups and individuals with respect to religious con-
duct. A difficult question for many of these cases is whether the use 
of tort law in cases of religiously motivated activities is a valid protec-
tion of the interests of individuals, or whether instead some such 
lawsuits tend toward religious persecution of unpopular minority re-
ligions. Competing interests include freedom to express religious 
faith through sharing with others and teaching about one’s relig-
ion—the attempt to “convert” others to a particular style of religious 
thought—an endeavor which may be a requirement of a particular 
religion. On the other side, targets of proselytism may have their 
own religious beliefs or may be equally interested in protecting their 
sphere of privacy. What role should courts play, particularly when a 
freedom to change religion underlies what many believe to be the 
 
 61. “Every legal society from the most primitive to the most modern must develop 
some set of rules that prevents one individual from harming another, and to offer redress for 
harms once inflicted.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS xxvii (1999). 
 62. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated “Outrageous” Conduct: Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against “Other People’s Faiths”, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
579, 580 (1993). 
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most important religious right to be protected by the government? 
Tort law generally recognizes First Amendment free speech in-
terests in attempts to persuade others in matters of belief that are 
nonreligious. Less well developed in the tort context is recognition 
of the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. As is true 
in the nonreligious “persuasion” context, there is as yet no immunity 
for religious proselytism against generally applicable rules of civil law. 
Although there is usually no free exercise problem in holding reli-
gious groups to the ordinary rules of contract, property, and tort, to 
some religious freedom advocates, some tort cases have exhibited a 
preference for Christian over “cult” proselytizing that is at least in 
some sense an ideological judgment. Of primary concern, perhaps, is 
the potential for judicial and juror viewpoint discrimination in tort 
cases concerning proselytism activities, particularly those that chal-
lenge religious indoctrination methods. As discussed in more detail 
further in this article, one problem to consider in the tort context is 
whether cases alleging inappropriate proselytism (short of physical 
harm) should be submitted to juries as a matter of course. 
A. Tort Cases Involving Proselytism: Recent History 
Lawsuits seeking damages for harms allegedly caused by religious 
proselytizing activities fall into a number of areas of traditional tort 
law. Courts have responded in various ways, though rarely have “free 
exercise” issues played a central role. Suits brought by individuals at-
tacking religious indoctrination methods usually raise some or all of 
the following tort claims: intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, false imprisonment, fraud, and sometimes defamation. 
Proselytism that takes place on private property is a trespass, and the 
owner may use tort law to enforce his or her private property right of 
exclusion. 
Proselytism that intrudes into a person’s private space may be an 
invasion of privacy, and, again, the individual may use the law of 
torts in response. One of the distinct forms of invasion of privacy 
recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts is the “unreason-
able intrusion upon the seclusion of another.”63 This claim has been 
successful in at least one case alleging harsh or excessive prosely-
tism.64 
 
 63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (2)(a) (1965). 
 64. See George v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
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Proselytism that includes coercive behavior, such as persuasive 
inducements or “strong-arm” tactics against vulnerable persons, such 
as teenage runaways, may support tort actions of various kinds. In 
cases in which physical abuse occurs, tort claims may include assault 
and battery. More common have been tort suits brought against 
“cults” for coercive behavior that falls short of assault or battery, and 
there have been other suits brought against de-programmers for 
“kidnaping” cult members and using intense psychological tech-
niques to bring them back to the mainstream. These actions, most 
recently one from the state of Washington,65 bear some resemblance 
to the use of tort cases against groups such as the Ku Klux Klan by 
the Anti-Defamation League and Southern Poverty Law Center.66 
1. Tort judgments in favor of disaffected members of “cults” 
Since the mid 1980s, legal claims based on so-called brainwash-
ing by some minority religions have had some success, most notably 
in several cases that resulted in large tort awards. Most of these suits 
involved no claims of physical violence but instead were based upon 
allegations of “tortious communications—misrepresentation, inflic-
tion of emotional distress—that were intertwined with the defen-
dants’ religious beliefs in ways never clearly separated at trial.”67 Per-
haps the most controversial basis for some of these lawsuits are 
claims that include failure to deliver on promises of greater happiness 
and well-being.68 
The tort of “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” a rela-
tively recent addition to tort law generally in the United States, is 
open-ended and invites judges (and particularly juries) to apply a 
community-based standard of behavior to the activity complained of. 
 
473 (Ct. App. 1992), review denied and opinion withdrawn, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2267 (Apr. 29, 
1992). 
 65. See Scott v. Cult Awareness Network, 140 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
526 U.S. 1033 (1999). 
 66. See generally MORRIS DEES & STEVE FIFFER, HATE ON TRIAL (1993) (describing 
litigation against KKK). 
 67. Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 715, 750 (1998). 
 68. See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n. for the Unification of World Christianity, 762 
P.2d 46 (1988); Richard Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under 
the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1977); James T. Richardson, “Brainwashing” 
Claims and Minority Religions Outside the United States: Cultural Diffusion of a Questionable 
Concept in the Legal Arena, 1996 BYU L. REV. 873. 
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According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the basis for the 
cause of action is as follows: 
§ 46 OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT CAUSING SEVERE 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other 
results from it, for such bodily harm. 
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is 
subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress 
(a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present 
at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or 
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress 
results in bodily harm.69 
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, or “outrage” 
as it is sometimes called, is a standard addition to lawsuits against so-
called “cults” by disaffected members, used to challenge proselytism 
tactics ranging from intense indoctrination (“brainwashing”) to im-
pairing a person’s ability or will to disassociate from the group. 
Courts in many states also permit claims for “negligent” inflic-
tion of emotional distress, that is, behavior directed toward another 
that posed a significant risk of causing emotional distress, whether or 
not the defendant specifically intended to cause the psychological 
harm.70 The preference for “intentional” over “negligent” infliction 
of emotional distress in the proselytism cases to date no doubt re-
flects the availability of punitive damages only in the intentional con-
text. 
Some of these suits may be part of a deliberate tactic of the so-
called anti-cult movement in an attempt to drive such groups out of 
business. In one instance, a jury awarded a judgment of $32 million 
against the Hare Krishna for various torts allegedly committed by re-
ligious speech and by persuasion of new adherents. The lawsuit, 
 
 69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
 70. See id. §§ 312, 313. 
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brought by Robin George and her mother, alleged that the defen-
dants began brainwashing Robin into joining the Krishna movement 
when she was fourteen years old and conspired to conceal her from 
her parents.71 The jury found for the Georges, awarding them com-
pensatory and punitive damages in excess of $32 million (which were 
later reduced by the trial court). Robin’s compensatory award (in ex-
cess of $1.8 million) included damages for false imprisonment, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful death, and libel; 
Marcia George’s $1,510,000 compensatory award was based on 
emotional distress and libel.72 The trial judge reduced the award to 
about $10 million, and the state appellate court reduced it further to 
about $6 million. The largest of the judgments against the Hare 
Krishna was vacated.73 Other large jury verdicts also have been re-
versed on appeal.74 Some courts have rejected tort claims based on 
“brainwashing” theories as not legally cognizable.75 
“Brainwashing” claims in the religious context are particularly 
problematic. In the nonreligious context, courts recognize “loss of 
will” and “coercive persuasion” as factors to be considered in some 
financial disputes, such as those involving wills, inter vivos gifts, and 
contracts. As one legal scholar has noted, 
Coercive persuasion occurs when one is persuaded to do something 
that, but for the influence or coercion, one would not have chosen 
to do. In effect, when one is “persuaded” to do something, his or 
her will is overcome by the persuasion as to that particular act. . . . 
[I]n [some] areas, the “loss of will” is neither minimal nor benefi-
cial to society or the coerced individual . . . . The two main kinds of 
coercion that offend a sense of fairness and autonomy are short-
 
 71. George v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473, 
478 (Ct. App. 1992), review denied and opinion withdrawn, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2267 (Apr. 29, 
1992). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. George, 499 U.S. 914 
(1991) (remanding to California court for reconsideration of punitive damages award in light 
of Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)). For a discussion of the case and 
its effect upon Hare Krishna activities in California, see Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 888–89 (1994). 
 74. See, e.g., Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App. 
1982) (reversing a $2 million verdict for plaintiff who claimed brainwashing). 
 75. See Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity, 589 F. 
Supp. 10 (1983); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity, 506 
N.Y.S.2d 174 (1986); People v. Murphy, 413 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1977); Fisher, supra note 60, at 
153 n.8. 
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term physical duress and long-term coercive persuasion.76 
Long-term coercive persuasion was one ground of the claim by the 
plaintiffs in George v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness 
of California,77 although other claims included false imprisonment, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and even wrongful 
death.78 
2. Counter-proselytism: “Deprogramming” the cult member 
Physical abductions of persons associated with religious move-
ments peaked in the 1970s and early 1980s but still occur from time 
to time. Known as “deprogramming,” the operative theory was that 
the individual had been drawn into a cult through mind control or 
brainwashing and thus had no ability to consent to the control of the 
“cult.”79 “Exit programming” is the preferred term for “counter-
proselytism” among Christian groups today. Individuals forcibly re-
moved from a religious group by deprogrammers have brought suit 
under a number of tort law theories, including false imprisonment, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery.80 
In 1999, the U.S. Supreme court denied certiorari in a “depro-
gramming” case from the Ninth Circuit.81 Jason Scott was 18 when 
 
 76. Ann Penners Wrosch, Comment, Undue Influence, Involuntary Servitude and 
Brainwashing: A More Consistent, Interests-Based Approach, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 499, 499–
500 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 
 77. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. 
 78. Robin George’s compensatory award in excess of $1.8 million included damages for 
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful death, and libel. The 
jury awarded Robin compensatory damages in the amount of $75,000 on her wrongful death 
cause of action, which was upheld on appeal. See id. at 512. Jim George, Robin’s father, died 
of a heart attack four months after Robin returned home. Plaintiffs’ expert witness testified that 
the father suffered significant stress in losing and trying to regain his daughter from the Hare 
Krishna. “[T]he trouble he had, trying to locate her, the blind alley that he went up, the con-
tact that he had with the Krishna organization and with the police department, et cetera, con-
tinued to aggravate his coronary disease.” Id. at 511. The expert concluded that these events 
significantly accelerated Jim George’s illness and that his delayed response to the stress—his 
suffering a heart attack nearly four months after Robin’s return home—was a relatively com-
mon occurrence. See id. 
 79. But cf. Catherine Wong, St. Thomas on Deprogramming: Is it Justifiable?, 39 CATH. 
LAW. 81 (1999) (reviewing history of anti-cult movement in the United States). 
 80. See, e.g., Eilers v. Coy, 582 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Minn. 1984); Cooper v. Molko, 512 
F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973); Pe-
terson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); Katz v. 
Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977). 
 81. See Scott v. Cult Awareness Network, 140 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
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he was taken from his mother’s home, at her request, to an isolated 
beach house for five days of religious “deprogramming” from his 
membership in Bellevue Life Tabernacle Church, affiliated with the 
United Pentecostal Church. The deprogrammers and others were ar-
rested and charged with unlawful imprisonment. They were acquit-
ted of criminal charges, and the tort suit followed. 
Scott’s suit named the nonprofit organization Cult Awareness 
Network (“CAN”), the individual “deprogrammer,” and other per-
sons as defendants, alleging state law negligence claims, the tort of 
“outrage,” and conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights. One de-
fendant settled before trial. A jury returned a verdict against the re-
maining defendants, awarding $875,000 in compensatory damages 
and $4 million in punitive damages. The jury allocated ten percent of 
the negligence liability and $1 million in punitive damages against 
CAN. A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
judgment and rejected CAN’s argument that the imposition of liabil-
ity violated the defendants’ First Amendment rights.82 
Judge Kozinsky dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc.83 
His objection was not about the correctness of the judgment against 
the individual defendants. Rather, Judge Kozinsky expressed concern 
with the application of vicarious liability against CAN itself, the or-
ganization that allegedly sponsored and encouraged the individual 
defendants to act. Judge Kozinsky argued that this case should be 
controlled by NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,84 because the judg-
ment effectively put CAN out of business and “silenced its message” 
without sufficient proof that the organization itself had known 
about, condoned, or ratified the actions taken by one of its “volun-
teers.”85 “[T]o impose liability . . . would impermissibly burden the 
rights of political association that are protected by the First Amend-
 
526 U.S. 1033 (1999). 
 82. Id. at 1280. 
 83. Scott v. Cult Awareness Network, 151 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 1998) (Kozinsky, 
J., dissenting from order rejecting suggestion for rehearing en banc). CAN filed for bankruptcy 
protection. Id. 
 84. See 458 U.S. 886 (1982). But cf. Eric William Cernyar, The Checking Value of Free 
Exercise: Religious Clashes with the State, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 220 (1999) (arguing 
that Claiborne Hardware principles prevent punishment or liability for actions of individual 
participants to be placed on a church itself, unless the church or religious organization “rati-
fies” the illegal activity). 
 85. Scott, 151 F.3d at 1248–49 (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 931) (Koz-
insky, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc).  
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ment.”86 Kozinsky analogized this case to allowing tort judgments to 
shut down Planned Parenthood because a pro-choice doctor illegally 
performs an abortion on a minor without obtaining parental con-
sent, or imposing liability on ACT-UP because one of its members 
punches a photographer.87 
3. Statutory civil rights claims 
A number of lawsuits against “cult” deprogrammers invoke the 
federal laws of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 to remedy civil rights 
violations. One advantage of plaintiffs in such actions is the award of 
attorneys’ fees in the event the plaintiff prevails on the civil rights 
claim. Another advantage, arguably, is a wider choice of forum for 
the plaintiff. A claim under the federal civil rights statute creates in-
dependent federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts. 
The reported cases to date reflect divergent views among courts 
about the applicability of the federal civil rights statutes to the vary-
ing facts in cases involving religious cults and deprogramming.88 Re-
ligious groups have been considered a protected class under § 
1985(3).89 Some courts have held that the federal civil rights statute 
is not implicated because no “class based animus” motivated the de-
programming activities complained of.90 More recent cases, including 
Scott v. Cult Awareness Network,91 have permitted the claims to pro-
ceed to trial for a jury to consider whether “religious discrimination” 
has occurred that is akin to invidious racial bias.92 Other sect mem-
bers have successfully sued their parents and others for deprivation of 
 
 86. Id. at 1249 (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 931). 
 87. See id. at 1250. 
 88. See generally Andrew P. Bacus, Note, The Adjudication of Religious Beliefs in Section 
1985(3) Deprogramming Litigation, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 413 (1986); Michael F. 
Coyne, Note, Federal Regulation of Intra-Family Deprogramming Conspiracies Under the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871: Ward v. Connor, 23 B.C. L. REV. 789 (1982); John D. Ensley, Note, 
Civil Rights: A Civil Remedy for Religious Deprogramming Victim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 
21 WASHBURN L.J. 663 (1982). 
 89. See, e.g., Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 
(1982). 
 90. Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 723 (D.R.I. 1978), aff’d, 558 F.2d 818 (1st 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979) (citing Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. 
Cal. 1978)). 
 91. 140 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1033 (1999). 
 92. See, e.g., Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1147 (1983); Ward, 657 F.2d 45; Eilers v. Coy, 582 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Minn. 1984); 
Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
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civil rights related to attempts to force them away from the minority 
religious group.93 A number of criminal proceedings against Ted Pat-
rick, a cult deprogrammer, resulted in convictions for “kidnapping” 
and unlawful imprisonment under state law.94 
4. Guardianship proceedings and other defenses 
One tactic of cult deprogramming groups has been to ask a court 
to appoint a guardian for a cult member in order to begin depro-
gramming proceedings. The tactic is preemptive litigation used to 
immunize a subsequent deprogramming regimen from civil suit.95 At 
the instigation of family members, a number of state and federal 
courts have considered whether to grant a conservatorship or guardi-
anship of an adult based on allegations that the person has been 
brainwashed by a religious cult or organization.96 Some courts have 
granted guardianships or conservatorships to parents of adult chil-
dren in order to force the individual into a deprogramming regi-
men.97 Other courts have refused such requests, at least when the 
subject of the proposed guardianship is an adult and usually on 
 
 93. See, e.g., Ward, 657 F.2d 45 (finding that plaintiff stated claim under 42 U.S.C. 
1985(c)); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that plaintiff 
stated claim against parents and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 94. See People v. Patrick, 179 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1982) (recounting felony and misde-
meanor convictions); People v. Patrick, 541 P.2d 320, 322 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (finding a 
conviction of false imprisonment). Other criminal proceedings against Ted Patrick are detailed 
in Fisher, supra note 60, at 172 n.61. 
 95. See Douglas Aronin, Cults, Deprogramming, and Guardianship: A Model Legislative 
Proposal, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163 (1982); Robert N. Shapiro, Of Robots, Persons, 
and the Protection of Religious Beliefs, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1277, 1279–80 (1983); Panel Dis-
cussion, Regulation of Alternative Religions by Law or Private Action: Can and Should We 
Regulate?, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109 (1979–80); Michael S. Bernick, Comment, 
To Keep Them Out of Harm’s Way? Temporary Conservatorships and Religious Sects, 66 CAL. L. 
REV. 845 (1978). 
 96. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Validity of Guardianship Proceeding Based on 
Brainwashing of Subject by Religious, Political, or Social Organization, 44 A.L.R. 4th 1207 
(1986). 
 97. See, e.g., In re Estate of Langford, 364 N.E.2d. 735 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (reversing 
an order denying a petition for appointment of a conservator, associated with the “Christ is the 
Answer” ministry). Unreported trial court opinions granting conservatorships or guardianships 
that were not appealed are difficult to document. However, trial courts in several cases initially 
granted a conservatorship or guardianship but were reversed on appeal. See Rankin v. Howard, 
457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978) (granting defendant probate judge’s summary judgment mo-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), rev’d in part, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 451 
U.S. 939 (1979); In re Guardianship of Polin, 675 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1983) cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 850 (1984); Katz v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (Ct. App. 1977). 
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grounds that application of the state’s conservatorship proceedings 
to this context would render the statute void because of unconstitu-
tional vagueness.98 
A court-appointed guardianship or conservatorship legalizes the 
seizure and confinement of cult members. A substantial number of 
such cases occurred in the 1970s and 1980s but are less common at 
present because of a number of court rulings challenging the consti-
tutionality of court-ordered conservatorships under the Federal Civil 
Rights Act.99 In Katz v. Superior Court,100 a California appellate 
court set aside a temporary conservatorship granted in favor of the 
parents of five adult members of the Unification Church. The court 
did so, in part, because it believed the evidence was insufficient to es-
tablish that the five adults were incompetent or represented a danger 
to themselves or to others: “in the absence of such actions as render 
the adult believer himself gravely disabled . . . the process of this 
state cannot be used to deprive the believer of his freedom of action 
and to subject him to involuntary treatment.”101 Relying on Katz, 
the Tenth Circuit also reversed a lower court order granting parents 
a conservatorship over their adult son.102 Like Katz, the federal ap-
peals court declined to hear evidence relating to competence due to 
a jurisdictional bar.103 Guardianship and conservatorship proceedings 
in order to force a cult member into deprogramming are less likely to 
be brought today, in light of the relative success of subsequent suits 
by the cult member against deprogrammers and family members for 
violation of civil rights.104 
When deprogrammers are sued in civil actions, they usually at-
tempt something similar to the “necessity” defense used in criminal 
 
 98. See, e.g., Katz, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234. 
 99. See Fisher, supra note 60, at 174–75 nn.67–75. 
 100. 141 Cal. Rptr. 234. 
 101. Id. at 256. 
 102. See Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1147 (1983). 
 103. See id. at 1351–52. 
 104. See Taylor, 686 F.2d 1346 (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants on 
the ground of the invalidity of their attempt to insulate themselves from liability for false im-
prisonment by a temporary guardianship order); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 
1978) (reversing a finding that the state probate judge was absolutely immune from suit on 
federal civil rights claim of conspiracy with codefendants to create fraudulently an ex parte 
guardianship); Katz, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234. 
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actions.105 These defenses on occasion have been successful, with the 
result that the deprogrammers sometimes escape any liability for 
their actions, which have sometimes involved kidnaping adults off 
the streets and incarcerating them against their will. The more recent 
trend is to deny the “choice of evils” or “necessity” defense used by 
deprogrammers unless the defendant can show that there was a dan-
ger of imminent physical injury to the “cult” member or others.106 
According to one scholar, the trend for courts in such cases today is 
to permit the necessity defense “in order to prevent imminent physi-
cal injury, but not to combat the effects of a cult’s alleged use of 
mind control or brainwashing.”107 
B. First Amendment Considerations and “Religious Torts” 
A number of potential “free exercise” issues remain to be re-
solved in civil litigation involving religious proselytism. Constitu-
tional law as yet has provided no blanket immunity in tort claims be-
cause of religiously motivated conduct. When religious organizations 
are sued by private individuals for allegedly tortious conduct, the 
First Amendment is not deemed to bar or circumscribe those activi-
ties that fall squarely within traditional tort law. Few would argue 
that religious conduct should be constitutionally protected even 
when it harms others, so long as the harm to others is outweighed by 
the importance of the conduct to the religious actor.108 
A problematic feature of religious tort lawsuits to date has been 
the varying results in the face of similar fact patterns. In religious tort 
cases involving proselytism, some courts have held that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause does not apply at all, while others have invoked the 
Free Exercise Clause to prevent recovery.109 The most important 
 
 105. See, e.g., State v. Howley, 920 P.2d 391, 396 (Idaho 1996); People v. Brandyberry, 
812 P.2d 674 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); see generally Wong, supra note 79, at 90–91; Ellen M. 
Babbitt, Note, The Deprogramming of Religious Sect Members: A Private Right of Action under 
§ 1985(3), 74 NW. U. L. REV. 229 (1979). 
 106. See Eilers v. Coy, 582 F. Supp. 1093, 1097 (D. Minn. 1984); Brandyberry, 812 
P.2d 674 (rejecting defendant’s choice of evils defense as justification for conspiracy and kid-
naping); People v. Patrick, 179 Cal. Rptr. 276, 282 (Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting defendant de-
programmer’s defense of necessity where defendant failed to prove “a danger of imminent 
physical harm”). 
 107. Wong, supra note 79, at 91. 
 108. Characterizing this view as “normatively unappealing” is Eugene Volokh, A Com-
mon-law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1510 (1999). 
 109. See discussion in Lee W. Brooks, Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
6HUN-FIN.DOC 8/1/01  7:08 PM 
537] Regulation of Religious Proselytism 
 567 
cases exhibiting ad hoc free exercise analysis have come in the con-
text of religious tort claims that allege intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.110 In one such instance, a widow claimed intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and fraud based upon a church’s so-
licitations and representations in television broadcasts and mail mar-
keting promising that a miracle cure had already occurred for her 
husband, who subsequently died.111 A Texas court held that the 
widow’s claims were barred by the First Amendment and the state 
constitution, because the claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and fraud would require judicial scrutiny into the truthful-
ness or reasonableness of the church’s religious beliefs.112 The First 
Amendment has also been held to limit the scope of fraud causes of 
action in connection with recruitment and indoctrination prac-
tices.113 By contrast, other courts have held that the First Amend-
ment does not necessarily bar suits challenging a group’s indoctrina-
tion practices.114 
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court changed its approach to free 
exercise analysis in Employment Division v. Smith.115 In Smith, the 
Court rejected the application of the “compelling interest” standard 
to examine claims for individual exemptions from generally applica-
ble laws based on religious belief. The Court stated that “the right of 
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to com-
ply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability.’”116 Al-
though the context of the case was a claimed exemption from stat-
utes governing the use of controlled substances (peyote), the 
broader implication applies as well to otherwise generally applicable 
tort law. As noted below, the Court’s decision in Smith instigated re-
sponsive legislation from Congress and a number of states to “over-
turn” the decision by restoring the “compelling interest” standard to 
 
by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be “Free Exercise”?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1296 
(1986), and Daryl L. Wiesen, Note, Following the Lead of Defamation: A Definitional Balanc-
ing Approach to Religious Torts, 105 YALE L.J. 291, 291–92 (1995). 
 110. See Wiesen, supra note 109, at 291–92. 
 111. See Smith v. Tilton, 3 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
 112. See id. at 87–88. 
 113. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 
1982). 
 114. See, e.g., Scott v. Cult Awareness Network, 140 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1033 (1999). 
 115. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 116. See id. at 879. 
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state and federal laws of general application which are alleged to pose 
a restriction on the free exercise of religion. 
Assuming the Court’s articulation of free exercise analysis in 
Smith remains the constitutional norm, the result for tort cases in-
volving proselytism would likely be less favorable to defenses based 
upon religious motivation in the conduct that is the subject of the 
lawsuit. If the “compelling interest” test is restored, arguably such 
defenses are bolstered in some tort cases involving proselytism: Cer-
tain conduct that might otherwise be actionable as fraud or outra-
geous conduct, for example, might be immunized from tort liability 
on the basis of a religious exemption for conduct falling short of 
physical abuse or false imprisonment. 
Almost all the cases that have tested the boundaries of First 
Amendment protection within tort law117 have involved what many 
Americans would consider to be fringe groups—Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
the Hare Krishna, “Moonies,” and Scientologists. As the American 
religious scene becomes ever more diverse, conflicts are likely to arise 
in connection with the practices of groups that may seem on the 
fringe to mainstream Jews and Christians, even though some of these 
groups may have large numbers of adherents elsewhere in the world 
and may be mainstream in other countries. From the perspective of 
constitutional law there must be concern for oppression of the mi-
nority from the tyranny of the mainstream. Some of the bitter reac-
tion to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Smith case about the use 
of peyote reflects a concern for the minority or the disenfranchised. 
(Some also may reflect disdain for hypocrisy since there was a reli-
gious exception for ceremonial wine during Prohibition.) 
A continuing discussion of the role of the Free Exercise Clause in 
defining the boundaries of proselytism in tort law may assist in pro-
tecting the interests of religious minorities. The law does give con-
siderable protection to speech, even speech by what many would 
consider to be “oddballs,” but categorizing proselytism as not only 
“speech” but also as an example of “free exercise” may raise it to a 
higher level of protection than other types of behavior that are sub-
 
 117. Many types of tort cases brought against religious bodies do not involve proselytism 
activities per se, such as suits by parishioners against clergy for sexual misconduct or by third 
parties related to employment. Such suits are not discussed here, except to the extent the Free 
Exercise Clause analysis used in these cases may be analogous to tort suits involving prosely-
tism. See generally Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Consti-
tutional Protection, 75 IND. L. J. 219, 245–49 (2000). 
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ject to tort lawsuits in the United States. 
In recent years, legislation has provided important developments 
concerning government recognition and regulation of religious activ-
ity in the United States. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), passed by Congress in 1997 in response to the Smith case, 
shortly thereafter was declared unconstitutional in some aspects by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.118 RFRA has spawned a plethora of similar 
legislation at the state level. Moreover, at the time of this writing, a 
bill pending in Congress, the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 
1999, provides that whenever a religious individual or institution is 
substantially burdened by any law the government may not enforce 
its law unless it proves the law is enacted for a compelling interest 
and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. 
One scholar has criticized the broad language of the proposed 
act on two grounds. First, its broad language would cover activities 
that absent religious motivation are crimes or torts, including “child 
abuse; endangerment; neglect laws, including those requiring medi-
cal treatment to prevent death or permanent disability; civil rights 
laws . . . domestic violence laws and land use laws.”119 Second, the 
bill requires that the government must prove that its law is the 
“‘least restrictive means’ with respect to the particular believer.”120 
The pending bill enacts the same standard to be applied to all gen-
eral laws, as did RFRA. Both the ACLU and the NAACP have ex-
pressed concerns about the proposal to the extent it curtails other 
civil rights laws.121 
C. Juries and the Counter-Majority Problem 
Proselytism and counter-proselytism pose problems in tort law 
because of the risk that a civil jury will award damages based upon 
the religious conviction of the make-up of its members. In the types 
of cases described above, the financial assets of religiously motivated 
groups are potentially depleted through such lawsuits. The risk is 
that juries apply their own collective religious belief in determining 
liability, and, as a statistical matter, the jurors will represent the 
 
 118. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1997). 
 119. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Conduct Crosses the Line, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 7, 
1999, at A9. 
 120. Id. (quoting RFRA). 
 121. See id. 
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dominant religious belief. The problem also occurs in criminal pro-
ceedings for forcible deprogramming. The defendants in Scott v. Cult 
Awareness Network122 were acquitted of false imprisonment and kid-
napping, for example, and similar cases have resulted in a mix of 
convictions and acquittals. To pose the issue squarely: are juries the 
best “neutral” decision makers to apply “neutral” tort doctrines to 
religiously motivated activities? The risk is real: one tactic by litigants 
seeking to prove tortious behavior by a religious group is to provide 
the jury with a witness who is an expert in cults, presumably to por-
tray deviant religious behavior.123 
One argument suggests that tort law is traditionally intolerant of 
socially undesirable conduct as defined by majority sentiment, most 
notably the tort of “outrage” or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Although judges exercise some control in this area,124 at 
least one scholar has argued that courts should not adjudicate claims 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress when the defendant’s 
allegedly tortious actions are religiously motivated.125 The tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, usually said to be reserved 
for conduct that is “outrageous” and “utterly intolerable in civilized 
society,” is controversial in its own right, apart from application in 
cases involving proselytism.126 
Clearly, a preference for Christian over “cult” proselytizing is at 
least in some sense an ideological judgment. In tort law, apart from 
“free speech” claims, courts have yet to safeguard religious prosely-
tism against judicial and juror viewpoint discrimination. In the tort 
context, should cases alleging inappropriate proselytism be submitted 
to juries as a matter of course? 
Of particular interest might be the development of a religious 
privilege in tort actions that is akin to the free speech privilege in 
defamation and invasion of privacy cases. Since 1964, libel and slan-
der defendants have enjoyed a substantial level of constitutional pro-
 
 122. 140 F.3d 1275. 
 123. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 699 (1986) (finding that the director 
of a cult awareness center testified that the practices of a church had many similarities to those 
of a cult). 
 124. Murphy v. International Soc’y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 
340 (Mass. 1991) (overturning a multimillion-dollar judgment against Hare Krishnas for al-
leged “brainwashing” and infliction of emotional distress in religious recruiting and practices). 
 125. See Hayden, supra note 62, at 581–82. 
 126. See generally William H. Theis, The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A 
Need for Limits on Liability, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 275, 290 (1977). 
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tection.127 Defamation suits and invasion of privacy suits128 may go 
forward and may be successful, but the defendants begin with an ad-
vantage not generally available to ordinary tort defendants—a pre-
sumption of at least some level of constitutional protection. Because 
speech is presumptively protected, the defamation plaintiff must 
plead and prove that the speech complained of is outside the area of 
presumptive protection. The burden on the plaintiff varies depend-
ing on the status of the plaintiff (public official, public figure, private 
figure) and the substance of the speech (to what does it relate), but 
the fact remains that there is a constitutional impediment to success-
ful defamation and invasion of privacy actions in many situations. 
Might there be a similar privilege for religious speech? It need not be 
absolute, and there might be varying standards as in the defamation 
area,129 but a presumption in favor of such speech would limit the 
power of the state through the use of the courts to hear and to en-
force tort actions for damages or injunctive relief based upon reli-
gious activity that does not violate bodily integrity or private prop-
erty rights. It might provide a basis as well for treating certain 
questions as “legal” issues to be decided by a judge rather than “fac-
tual” issues to be decided by juries. 
Early on, the United States rejected the prohibition against 
“blasphemous libel” in the common law of England. Other nations 
have more severe forms of “blasphemous libel” prohibitions, includ-
ing Sudan.130 Although United States courts have long been unani-
mous that ideological or content objections should not be the basis 
for tort actions, there is no way to know whether jurors base their 
decisions in whole or in part on these objections. Harm resulting 
from method is different, and tort doctrines themselves are viewed to 
recognize this distinction. However, there may be a need to protect 
 
 127. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing a privilege 
for speech about public officials unless the speech was both false and made with actual malice 
or reckless disregard for the truth). The privilege was subsequently extended to cover speech 
about “public figures,” who are not public officials. Curtis Pub’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967). Speech about a private figure is not so privileged; the plaintiff need not meet the “ac-
tual malice/reckless disregard” standard, although state law may not impose liability for speech 
without fault. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
 128. A similar privilege exists in privacy cases as well. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 
U.S. 374 (1967). 
 129. See Wiesen, supra note 109, at 291. 
 130. See Stahnke, supra note 9, at 335 n.240 and accompanying text. 
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minority religious traditions from the dominant religious tradition of 
the majority reflected through the jury system. 
D. Proselytism and U.S. Tort Law in the International Human Rights 
Perspective 
How well does the legal regulation of proselytism in the United 
States fit within the emerging framework of international human 
rights? Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights provides: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his free-
dom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms of others.131 
Similarly, the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 9, provides that 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and re-
ligion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.”132 The European Court of Human Rights 
has held that proselytism is a component of the freedom of religion 
guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention.133 
These international human rights documents (and others with 
similar wording)134 address proselytism only generally and indirectly, 
 
 131. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 
1966, art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 132. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 464, 467–68 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 1995). 
 133. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1993). 
 134. See Stahnke, supra note 9, at 268–69 and accompanying notes (“All major interna-
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leading one scholar to conclude that 
[T]he effect of international human rights obligations on conflicts 
engendered by proselytism has been minimal. International bodies 
have either not dealt extensively with the problem or have not been 
particularly aggressive in defining the parameters of the freedom to 
engage in proselytism. This silence, or reluctance to deal with 
proselytism issues, may be the result of the widely divergent prac-
tices of states, ranging from severe limitations on the activity in all 
of its forms to broad freedom to engage in the activity regardless of 
the effect it may have on the target.135 
Tort lawsuits in the United States have provided courts with 
numerous opportunities to define the boundaries of the freedom to 
engage in proselytism, though with widely divergent results. None-
theless, even those courts that have permitted tort judgments against 
defendants engaged in proselytism seem to do so in general agree-
ment with these international human rights norms. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The legal regulation of proselytism in the United States is both 
public and private. Governments regulate proselytism in public 
spaces, and tort law enforces some privacy and freedom interests in 
private spaces. In the public arena, courts have taken the lead in de-
fining “public” and “private” areas and in defining the boundaries 
under the First Amendment between the rights of proselytizers and 
the interests of government. No great changes in this balance are 
likely to occur with any of the recent legislation in Congress related 
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. On the other hand, pri-
vate litigation in tort has exploded in recent years concerning the 
subject of religious proselytization and persuasion tactics of some so-
called “cults.” Courts in this area seem less sure how to define the 
boundaries of First Amendment rights in individual contexts. The 
individual cases alleging tortious behavior vary widely, not only in 
the facts they present, but also in the analysis engaged in by courts to 
resolve the dispute. 
The competing interests in proselytism-related tort cases are the 
right of religious expression, on the one hand, and the full panoply 
 
tional human rights documents recognize the right to freedom of religion, which includes not 
only the freedom to hold religious beliefs, but also the freedom to manifest those beliefs.”). 
 135. Stahnke, supra note 9, at 339. 
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of privacy and freedom rights historically recognized in tort law in 
the United States, on the other. Because the Supreme Court has 
clearly relegated proselytism in private spaces to a lesser-protected 
sphere, many courts question whether the First Amendment is appli-
cable in these cases at all, at least where no state action is involved. 
How well the traditional tort system in the United States handles 
these cases remains to be seen. The likelihood is high, however, that 
tort cases in the “private” sphere will continue to pose significant is-
sues in regulation of proselytism in the United States. 
 
 
 
